Fragmented and restructuring

The geopolitical landscape in the Eurasian region continues to evolve against the backdrop of intensified geopolitical competition between Russia and the West

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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Eurasian states have embarked on divergent developmental paths with different prospects. The outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in February 2022 further accelerated the geopolitical fragmentation and restructuring in the region and fundamentally altered the integrated model centered around Russia.

First, Eurasian states have complicated relations with Russia and there have been persistent forces to keep them from getting too close. While Eurasian countries rely on Russia economically and in terms of security, they remain highly sensitive to sovereignty, territorial integrity and other issues, and fear that closer ties with Russia may compromise their independence and national sovereignty.

Second, major Eurasian economies are predominantly driven by raw material exports and the absence of a cohesive regional industry value chain undermines the foundation for economic integration. Eurasian economies are at the lower end of the global value chain. Without established and complementary industrial cooperation, bilateral trade within the region remains limited. For example, Russia's trade with Eurasian countries has been reduced to a low level these years. In Kazakhstan, among its top 10 trading partners in 2023, only Russia and Uzbekistan were from the Eurasian region.

Third, against the backdrop of intensified geopolitical competition between Russia and the West, Eurasian countries have adopted divergent foreign policy strategies. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West saw Russia as the loser of the Cold War and has consistently sought to squeeze its strategic space and contain its development. Under Western influence, countries such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have increasingly distanced themselves from Russia and leaned toward the West, striving to join the European Union or North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Notably, Ukraine terminated its non-alignment policy in response to the 2014 Crimea crisis, and changed its Constitution in 2019 to include the goal of membership in the EU and NATO.

Across the Eurasian region, only Belarus remains firmly aligned with Russia. Most other countries pursue a multi-vector foreign policy, which seeks to maintain cooperation with Russia while strengthening ties with powers outside the region. Central Asian nations have established various "C5+1" mechanisms and are engaged in deeper cooperation with the United States, the EU, Turkiye, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

Amid unprecedented global changes, the Eurasian region is seeing another round of turbulence and realignment, accelerated by the Ukraine crisis. Continued geopolitical competition between Russia and the West may lead to further instability and a more diversified geopolitical landscape in the region.

First, the region is expected to become increasingly fragmented. Ukraine and Moldova will move further toward the West. Even though NATO membership remains out of reach for now, Ukraine has signed security agreements with multiple European nations to ensure enduring security commitments. Moldova has also signed a security and defence partnership agreement with the EU to deepen military and security cooperation.

Meanwhile, Russia is strengthening its alliance with Belarus by deploying tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and making it Russia's sole strategic outpost in the West.

The South Caucasus is expected to become a key link for trade across the Eurasian continent. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kazakhstan are accelerating the development of the Trans-Caspian international transport corridor, with the EU planning to invest 10 billion euros ($10.5 billion) in the project. Russia and Azerbaijan are also promoting the International North-South Transport Corridor.

Central Asia will also maintain its diversified geopolitical landscape. The region is strategically located at the heart of Eurasia with abundant energy resources. As Western countries and other nations outside the region such as Turkiye have stepped up their engagement with Central Asia, Central Asian countries have followed their multi-vector foreign policies to strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation in order to safeguard their sovereignty and security.

Second, "de-Russification" will continue. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly independent states have prioritized sovereignty, territorial integrity, as well as national identity. Many have focused on strengthening the indigenous ethnicities by promoting local history and languages. As a result, the influence of the Russian language is gradually diminishing across the Eurasian region. Russian is now considered an official language in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, a second official language in Belarus, and a language of inter-ethnic communication in Tajikistan. It has no official status in other Central Asian countries. The Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union has also encountered numerous challenges in terms of the free movement of goods, capital and labor due to Western sanctions.

Third, great power rivalry between Russia and the West may escalate tensions in the region and destabilize some countries.

Since the onset of the Ukraine crisis, Moldova's domestic tensions have worsened, pushing the long-standing Transnistria issue to a tipping point. While the South Caucasus has seen signs of reconciliation, domestic unrest persists in Georgia and Armenia, with opposition forces staging multiple rounds of protests. Given the region's strategic significance, external forces are expected to step up their intervention and pose challenges to regional stability.

For China, the Eurasian region is both a key focus of its neighborhood diplomacy and a vital area for advancing the Belt and Road Initiative. Amid the geopolitical restructuring triggered by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, China has leveraged its economic advantages and multilateral cooperation frameworks to strengthen ties with Eurasian nations, acting as a key force for regional stability and prosperity. China and Central Asian nations are now cooperating in a wide range of areas, including energy, infrastructure, industrial investment, agriculture, environmental protection and cultural exchanges. Central Asia has become a pioneering and demonstration region for the BRI.

China established a strategic partnership with Ukraine in 2011 and continues to view Ukraine as an important partner in Eurasia. Regarding the Ukraine crisis, China has maintained an impartial stance and has played a constructive role by standing up for peace, advocating dialogue and negotiations, and proposing a series of peace initiatives to facilitate a political solution to the conflict. In 2023, China's Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis was released, highlighting 12 key points. It received widespread international recognition.

China calls for the establishment of a balanced, effective, and sustainable security framework in Europe. China has appointed a special envoy to carry out three rounds of shuttle diplomacy and will continue to play a proactive role in seeking a resolution to the Ukraine crisis.

Looking ahead, as the regional landscape continues to evolve, China is expected to maintain its neutrality while further promoting regional economic cooperation and contributing to stability and development across Eurasia.

The author is a research professor and deputy secretary-general of the Academic Committee at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.